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I. INTRODUCTION
An important trend of the post-war period is evidenced by the
,expanding role of the municipal attorney from watchdog of munici-
pal contracts and defense counsel in tort actions to counsel for the
;city's consumer-citizens as well. Lack of consumer representation
before state and national regulatory agencies, an expanded concept
of the municipality's functions, and the urgent need for an advocate
representing the general public1 have been responsible for making
the municipality and the city attorneys spokesmen for consumers in
urban areas. While most municipal representation has been before
pubic utility or public service commissions, a few cities, including
the City of Pittsburgh, 2 have also represented the public's interest
in matters concerning the regulation of milk prices. As in other
matters pertaining to price regulation, the needs and welfare of the
general citizen can be easily overlooked by well-organized lobbies
of special-interest groups; the city can act as referee in highlighting
these needs and protecting the interests of the general public.
While state health regulation of milk dates back to the nine-
teenth century, governmental price regulation of milk products was
first initiated as a depression-fighting measure in the early 1930's
when an attempt was made to stabilize the precarious economic
position of the rural community. As stated in the Pennsylvania
Milk Control Act of 1937:
Milk producers must make deliveries of their highly
perishable commodity immediately after it is produced, and
must generally accept any market at any price .... Hence,
milk producers are subject to fraud and imposition, and do
.In the preparation of this paper, the author is indebted to Marion Finkelhor, Assistant City Solicitor
for the City of Pittsburgh, and gratefully wishes to acknowledge her assistance.
1 In the 1959 session of the Pennsylvania Legislature, H.B. 2347 was introduced to create a state
office of consumer counsel to represent the general public before regulatory agencies. The bill was
not enacted. A number of other states, however, do provide for consumer representation of this
nature at the state level.
2 The City of Pittsburgh has also represented the public in other non-utility proceedings, such




not possess the freedom of contract necessary for the pro-
curing of cost of production.
3
New York passed legislation to control the price of fluid milk in
1933. By 1941, approximately half of the states had passed similar
legislation.
4
The federal government also entered the field when key legis-
lation was passed in 1933 and 1935. 5 These acts, however, limited
federal orders to producer-minimum prices. These orders are insti-
tuted only upon request of area-producers, 6 and are established by
formulas designed to maintain a relationship between the price of
milk and the national index of other prices.
The regulation of the price of milk has been sharply debated on
an urban-rural basis with political pressures from interested groups.
Smaller dealers or processors, as well as various farm groups, have
supported milk controls in an attempt to eliminate competitive prac-
tices of nation-wide milk-processing corporations. Today, as a
result, eighteen states7 have some form of milk price control, and
each year shows new legislative activity either to decontrol milk in
those states with controls, or to control it in those with free mar-
kets.8 Within the period 1958-1959, in three states presently con-
trolled, the governor 9 either requested legislation to abolish controls
or vetoed more restrictive legislation. The legislative bodies of two
of the states introduced decontrol bills in 1959,10 and one state"
repealed state price control. Bills to initiate price regulation were
introduced in eleven states12 and one state13 adopted a control law.
Within the eighteen states which presently regulate milk prices,
3 Pa. Laws 1937, P. L. 417, as amended, Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 31, § 700j-101 (1958).
4 COHO, Milk Price Control, A Developing Field of Administrative Law, 45 Dick. L. Rev. 254
(1941). In Michigan, Utah, Maryland, Washington and Louisiana, the state supreme courts have held
the statutes to be unconstitutional: Johnson v. Michigan Milk Marketing Board, 295 Mich. 644, 295
N.W. 346 (1940), (improper board members); Rowell v. State Board of Agricultture, 98 Utah 353, 99
P.2d 1 (1940), (lack of adequate standards); State v. Moitrejean, 193 La. 824, 192 So. 361 (1939),
(unlawful delegation of Legislative Power); Maryland Cooperative Milk Producers v. Miller, 170 Md.
81, 182 AIl. 432 (1936), (invalid transfer of legislative responsibility); Griffiths v. Robinson, 181
Wash. 438, 43 P.2d 977 (1935), (lack of adequate standards). See generally annot. 119 A.L.R. 243
(1939); 155 A.L.R. 1383 (1945)
5 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935. 49 Stat. 753 as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1958).
6 In July 1960 there were 76 areas covered by federal milk.marketing orders.
7 Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, Vermont and Virginia. See Appendix of state laws following this article.
8 U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Role of Governments in Pricing Fluid Milk in the United States,
Agricultural Marketing Series No. 335, (Sept. 1959).
9 Florida, Massachusetts and New Hampshire.
10 Maine and Rhode Island.
11 Connecticut.
12 Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
South Dakota, Tennessee and Wisconsin.
13 Louisiana.
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there is statutory authority to regulate producer (i.e., farm) prices
in seventeen and resale prices in twelve. While most states, such as
Pennsylvania, regulate only the minimum price, this regulation fre-
quently becomes the maximum. Statutes in Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, New Hampshire, Vermont and Virginia14 authorize both a
minimum and maximum price. Most acts include some provision
requiring that dealers and handlers be licensed, that reports be filed
by dealers to assure payment of the established price, and that deal-
ers furnish bonds to insure compliance with price regulations.
Administrative organization of milk controls ranges from a
single executive, usually attached to the State Agriculture Depart-
ment,15 to a commission which frequently includes representatives
of the special-interest groups directly concerned with the pricing
problem. As stated by Mr. Justice Spence of the California Supreme
Court, in commenting on the California Milk Marketing Act, "The
Act is aimed primarily at what the producer shall receive, and not at
what the dealer or consumer shall pay ....
In the administration of milk price-control laws a state may be
divided into pricing areas with or without special local control
boards in each area. While most statutes provide for the initiation
.of price -regulation by the commission, the statutes in New York,
Florida, Nevada, California, Alabama and Louisiana follow the fed-
eral practice, and do not institute controls without a petition from a
specified percentage of the producers in the price area.' 7 Other than
in their general position as voters, consumers usually have little
voice as to whether or not an area is controlled, and representatives
of consumer interests tend to be outnumbered as members of the
state commissions." However, in the final analysis, the urban
,dweller is the major purchaser of fluid milk and milk products, and
,so there is a need for the representation of his views in any price-
-fixing proceedings. While statutes generally contain language re-
.quiring consideration of consumer interests, obviously such interests
can be protected only by adequate representation.
II. PARTY IN INTEREST
In many instances, a municipal corporation may bring a repre-
sentative action on behalf of its citizens to protect a common right
even though these citizens could bring individual suits. As stated in
American Jurisprudence:
A municipality has authority to file a bill to restrain a
breach of a contract for the furnishing of utility service
under specified terms, notwithstanding its inhabitants or
citizens can redress the wrong individually or collectively,
and is a proper party in proceedings to require a public
service company to continue the performance of its public
service in a reasonably adequate manner for the benefit
of the municipality and its inhabitants .... 19
14 Safeway Stores v. Milk Comm'n 197 Va. 69, 87 S.E.2d 769 (1955) (commission denied power
to establish single price).
15 New York, New Jersey and California are examples of this type of administrative organiza-
tion.
16 Knudsen Creamery Co. v. Brock, 37 Cal. 2d 485, 490, 234 P.2d 29 (1951).
17 Role of Governments in Pricing Fluid Milk in the Unifed States, op. cit., supra. Note 8, at 29-38.
18 The constitutionality of commissions composed of a majority of producers and dealers has
-been upheld: Board of Supervisors v. State Milk Comm'n, 191 Va. 1, 60 S.E. 2d 35 (1950); Fleisher v.
Duncan, 195 Ga. 309, 24 S.E. 2d 15 (1943). Thompson v. Statte Milk Control Board, 241 Ala. 100,
1 So. 2d 381 (1941). Contra, Johnson v. Milk Marketing Board, 295 Mich. 644, 295 N.W. 346 (1940).
19 38 Am. Jur. Municipal Corporations § 720 (1941).
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Under this theory of consumer representation, it has become a com-
mon practice for the municipality to represent the public's interest
in price-fixing hearings before state and national regulatory
agencies.
Furthermore, national and state administrative procedure acts
have explained which persons are entitled to appear before an
administrative agency. While not applicable to state agencies, the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act, for example, provides that:
So far as the orderly conduct of public business per-
mits, any interested person may appear before any agency
• . .for the presentation, adjustment, or determination of
any issue, request, or controversy in any proceeding .... 20
The Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Act of 1945,21 similar
to procedure acts in other states, is even more specific, and defines
a party with a "direct interest" to include "federal, state or local
instrumentalities, political subdivisions or officers thereof." A city
has been held to have a sufficient interest both as a consumer and
as a municipality to enable it to file complaints and participate in
public utility hearings relating to gas2 2 and water 2' rates. This con-
cept of persons entitled to appear before an administrative agency
is substantially broader than the common law doctrine of parties
with a legally-protected right.
Although the various milk-control statutes use different pricing
and administrative techniques, most statutes include the consumer
as an interested party in milk-pricing procedures. For example, the
California milk law defines "consumer" as "any person who buys
milk, cream or dairy products for consumption and not for resale,"
and further provides that "any order of the director thereunder
substantially affecting the rights of any interested party may be
reviewed by any court of competent jurisdiction.' 2 4 The Virginia
Milk Code provides for an appeal from a price order or any other
"general action, rule, regulation or order of the commission" by any
"aggrieved" person.25
The Pennsylvania Milk Control Law provides for notice of hear-
ing to all "interested persons," i.e., "all persons who may be affected
by an order of the commission fixing prices,"2 6 and who have signi-
fied their desire to be notified. "Any person aggrieved" by an order
of the commission has the right to appeal.2 7 In interpreting these
provisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found producers to
be such an "aggrieved person" in an order affecting dealers;;2 1 but a
labor union representing the milk drivers throughout the state was
held not to be a party in interest even though the ruling regulating
deliveries woud affect some member-drivers. In Pennsylvania Crr-
mercial Drivers Conference v. Pennsylvania Milk Control Comm'n,-5' 1
Mr. Justice Linn stated:
Here, the general order appealed from is capable of
2060 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (1952).
21 Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 71, § 1710.1 (Supp. 1959).
22 City of Pittsburgh v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 158 Pa. Super, 229, 234, 44 A. 2d 614 (1945).
Cf., City of Pittsburgh v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 153 Pa. Super, 83, 33 A.2d 641 (1943).
23 Inter.State Water Co. v. City of Danville, 379 Ill. 41, 39 N.E. 2d 356 (1942).
24 Cal. Agr. Code § 4255.
25 Va. Code Ann., § 3-371 (1950).
26 Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 31 § 700i-801 (1958).
27 Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 31 § 700i-901 (1958).
28 Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm'n, 332 Pa. 15, 1 A.2d 775, (1933).
29 360 Pa. 477, 484, 62 A.2d 9, 13 (1948).
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directly affecting only "persons engaged in business as milk
dealers, handlers or distributors, consumers and producers."
Therefore any effect which it may have upon persons em-
ployed by milk dealers, handlers and distributors individ-
ually, or upon their representative union, is a remote conse-
quence of the order and is therefore indirect and incidental.
Similarly, dealers were held not to be a party in interest in a
pricing order limited to subdealers.30 But, in American Can Co. v.
Milk Control Board,31 the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that
the statutory designation "person aggrieved" 32 included a manufac-
turer of milk containers and granted the right to appeal from a milk
commission order. Mr. Justice Qua stated:
Furthermore, we think that a person "interested" and a
person "aggrieved" need not be within the c'ass of persons
who are directly commanded by the order of the board
either to act or to refrain from acting, nor need he be
engaged in any branch of the milk business.
3 3
In interpreting their statute, the New York courts have limited
the right of appeal to only the parties of record; consequently, one
30 Rieck Dairy Co. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 69 Douph. 345 (Dauphin Co. C.P. Ct. 1958).
31 313 Mass. 156, 46 N.E.2d 542 (1943).
32 Mass. Ann. Lows. ch. 94A, § 21 (1954).
33 313 Mass. 156, 46 N.E.2d, 542, 544 (1943).
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who has not appeared at the public hearing was not qualified to
seek review of the commission's order.
3 4
In one case, the City of Pittsburgh appealed to the court from a
procedural ruling of the Pennsylvania commission, and the city's
status to maintain such an appeal was recognized.3 5 In Board of
Supervisors v. State Milk Comm'n,36 an action against an order of
the Virginia Milk Control Commission was brought by both the
board and interested civic groups. Again, while the court rejected
the constitutional arguments of the parties, their right to bring the
action was not questioned.
The language of milk-control statutes appears to be sufficiently
broad in its recognition of consumer interests to permit action by
municipal governments to protect the common rights of all citizens.
III. RATE OF RETURN
The early cases relating to milk price-control were primarily
concerned with the constitutionality of the new laws. Beginning in
1933, with the Rochester grocer who sold two quarts of milk and a
50 loaf of bread at the bargain price of 180, in violation of the 90
per quart order established by the New York Milk Control Board,
7
the status of milk as a product "affected with a public interest" has
withstood constitutional attack. As stated by Mr. Justice Jackson in
Hood & Sons v. DuMond:
Production and distribution of milk are so intimately
related to public health and welfare that the need for regu-
lation to protect those interests has long been recognized
and is, from a constitutional standpoint, hardly contro-
versial. Also, the economy of the industry is so eccentric
that economic controls have been found at once necessary
and difficult. These have evolved detailed, intricate and
comprehensive regulations, including price fixing. They
have been much litigated but were generally sustained by
this Court as within the power of the state .... 38
Questions as to whether the statute was an unlawful delega-
tion of legislative power,39 lacked adequate standards of control,
40
constituted special legislation 41 or whether the emergency aspects
of the depression had ended 42 have in most instances been resolved
in favor of the state milk-control commissions. But the thorny prob-
lem of finding a standard by which to establish a "fair price" for
producer, dealer and consumer has remained.
Milk price statutes are usually based upon price schedules for
84 Niagara Frontier Co-operative Milk Producers v. DuMond, 297 N.Y. 75, 74 N.E.2d 315 (1947);
Beck v. Ten Eyck. 162 Misc. 5, 294 N.Y.S. 541 (1937). See also City of Pittsburgh v. Public Utilities
Comm'n 153 Pa. Super. 83, 33 A.2d 641 (1943).
85 City of Pittsburgh v. Milk Control Comm'n 5 D. & C. 2d 685 (Dauphin Co. C. P. Ct. 1954).
86 Board of Supervisors v. State Milk Comm'n, 191 Va. 1, 60 S.E.2d 35 (1950).
37 Nebbla v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The present New York statute is limited to pro-
ducer prices.
38 336 U.S. 525, 529 (1948).
39 Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937); Franklin v. State, 232 Ala. 637, 169
So. 295 (1936); Abbotts Dairies v. Armstrong. 141 N.J. 319, 102 A2d 372 (1954). Contra, Johnson v.
Milk Marketing Board, 295 Mich. 644, 295 N.W. 346 (1940). See also Ann., 110 A.L.R. 644 (1937);
119 A.L.R. 243 (1939); 155 A.L.R. 1383 1945).
40 Board of Supervisors v. State Milk Comm'n, 191 Va. 1, 60 S.E.2d 35 (1950); Taylor v. State, 237
Ala. 178, 186 So. 463 (1939).
41 United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533 (1939). Contra, State v. Stoddard, 126 Conn.
623, 13 A.2d 586 (1940).
42 Como Farms, Inc., v. Foran, 6 N.J. Super. 306, 71 A.2d 201 (1950); Milk Comm'n v. Dade
County Dairies, 145 Fla. 579, 200 So. 83 (1940).
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different classes of milk and upon attempts to regulate the pro-
duction of fluid milk by one of the following plans:
1. Base-rate quotas,
43
2. Classification of use,
44
3. Pooling of returns,
45
4. Relationship of fluid milk to manufactured dairy products,
or to a general commodity price index.
46
Federal milk marketing orders utilize all four approaches, but
control may be terminated at the request of fifty percent of the
producers within the federal marketing area.
Orders by state regulatory bodies as to the minimum price to
be paid to producers and minimum or maximum- prices to be
charged by milk dealers are founded upon these basic marketing
plans, and may often provide an unrealistic picture of actual milk
prices. Thus, in states which authorize payment by the ultimate
utilization of the product, the "blend" or utilization price determines
the actual income of the producer rather than the individual price
for any given class of milk.4 7 Furthermore, the utilization price
may fall, even though the minimum price order does not change.
While these practices may seem remote to the urban consumer,
these factors are the paramount economic bases for milk price
control and directly affect the resulting retail prices.
Most state statutes and court decisions tend to emphasize the
factors of cost of production and distribution as the base for a
milk price which will yield a reasonable return to producer and
dealer. This is different from the more conventional criteria of"net assets," "return on investment" or "net worth," which are
among the tools of public utility regulation.
The New York Act of 1937, as subsequently amended, requires
the commissioner to take into consideration the balance between
production and consumption of milk, "the cost of production and
43 Ala. Code Ann., § 223 (Supp. 1955). Base-rate quotas attempt to limit the production of milk
to the amount necessary to supply the fluid milk demands of the consumer by limiting each pro-
ducer to a base quota for Class I, i.e., bottled milk. Production in excess of this allowance must be
sold at manufactured milk prices.
44 Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 3 700-801 (1958). Classification of use provides for payment for the
producers output at a "blend price", based upon the ultimate utilization of the milk by the processor.
45 New York Consol. Laws, art. 21 § 258 (m) (1954); Cal. Agri. 21. Code § 4294. The system of"pooling", originated by cooperative milk marketing associations and utilized by the Milk Control
Division of the New York State Department of Agriculture divides returns on an area basis so that
each producer receives an equivolent return for his total product regardless of the utilization of an
individual former's output.
4645 Stat. 753 (1935), as amended, 7 U.S.C. 1 5 (1952).
47 For a complete discussion of the economic aspects of the "rate base" in milk control, see
Griswold, The Control "Rate Base" in Milk, 45 Dick. L. Rev. 135 (1941) and Coho, Milk Price Control-
A Developing Field of Administrative Low, 45 Dick. L. Rev. 254 (1941).
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distribution .. .the cost of feeding stuffs . . . the supply of milk
in each market and the purchasing power and welfare of the
public. ' 48 The North Carolina Act of 1953 includes, in addition to
production and distribution costs, "the prices of other foods and
other commodities. '49 Resale prices in California, however, are
determined not only on production and distribution costs, but also
include "a reasonable return upon necessary capital investment,"
based upon representative distributors and retail stores engaged
in the distribution of milk.50 The Montana statute provides that
retail price of milk per quart shall not be more than "twice the
price paid by the distributor to the producer for the same grade
and butterfat content of fluid milk.
51
In Pennsylvania, a "reasonable return" to the producer is de-
fined as "cost of production and a reasonable profit," but the stan-
dard of a "reasonable return" for the dealer is undefined. In ascer-
taining a basis for arriving at a "reasonable return," the Pennsyl-
vania statute further provides that "the commission shall utilize
a cross-section representative of the average or normally efficient
producers and dealers or handlers in the area.
'52
As early as 1934, the effect of fixed minimum prices upon the
high-cost processors was questioned by the Supreme Court in
Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin.53 Mr. Justice Cardozo stated:
The appellant would have us say that minimum prices
must be charged whenever a particular dealer can show
that the effect of the schedule in its application to himself
is to deprive him of a profit. This is not enough to subject
administrative rulings to revision by the courts. If the des-
ignation of a minimum price is within the scope of the
police power, expenses or losses made necessary thereby
must be borne as an incident, unless the order goes so far
beyond the needs of the occasion as to be turned into an act
of tyranny .... The Fourteenth Amendment does not pro-
tect a business against the hazards of competition. (Empha-
sis added).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Colteryahn Dairy v. Milk
Control Comm'n, interpreted the Pennsylvania law as providing
that all factors enumerated in the statute should be considered
by the commission as follows:
The theory that segregation of the classes is essential
in determining fair return, no doubt led the court below to
adopt the sales dollar return as a convenient basis for price
fixing. We do not hold this theory incorrect applied to the
total business of the dealer although it is a new standard
and may produce a return of a very large per cent on fair
value. It may be that "fair return" should be based upon
the same rules governing the return of a public utility or
upon a combination of these two theories, or some other
standard may be adopted. We do not attempt to lay down
48 New York Consol. Laws, art. 21, 258 (m) (1954).
49 N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann., § 106-266.8 (Supp. 1959).
50 Cal. ASri. Code §§ 4354, 4360. See also Challenge Cream & Butter Ass'n v. Parker, 23 Cal.2d
137, 142 P.2 737 (1943); Jersey Milk Products v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d 620, 91 P.2d 577 (1939).
51 Mont. Rev. Code Ann., § 27-407 (1947).
52 Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 31 1 700i-801 (1958). See also Nev. Rev. Stat., Tit. 51 1 584-568 (1959).
53 293 U.S. 163, 170 (1934).
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any theory of fair return. It is the duty of the Commission
to devise such a theory as will conform to the law, basing
its conclusion on sufficient evidence .... 54
The actual result of the Colteryahn decision, however, has
been to focus the attention of the Pennsylvania Milk Control Com-
mission on the dealer's cost of production and the percentage of
net return on his sales. Calculation of costs is further complicated
by the Pennsylvania commission's practice of presenting these
dealer costs in evidence as an aggregate figure including the larger
as well as smaller dealers. In statistics prepared by the Pennsyl-
vania Milk Control Commission for a recent hearing held to fix
milk prices in the Pittsburgh area, a percentage of 1.89% return
on net sales yielded 10.39% return on net assets. This figure, ob-
viously, is substantially larger than the permissible return in the
public utility field.5 5 Representatives of consumers, including the
City of Pittsburgh, have attempted to shift commission attention
to the inflationary aspect of "net sales" as the basis for milk prices.
The greatest problem in attempting to maintain existing price
patterns for consumers is probably the wide economic range rep-
resented by the various milk processors. Nationwide multi-product
dealers5 6 with large budgets and administrative costs compete with
the family-operated milk distributor. Under the New York milk
control statute of 1933, a price differential established between
advertised and non-advertised brands of fluid milk was upheld
by the United States Supreme Court as a valid classification based
upon existing trade practices. 51 In more recent years, however,
some consumer groups have successfully emphasized the need for
the settling of maximum as well as minimum prices. In a New
Jersey case decided in 1954, the court approved the power of the
state director to establish the minimum as the maximum price
under the New Jersey milk price control law. In interpreting this
statute which was silent on the question of maximum price, the
New Jersey court stated:
It is true that the immediate evil in 1933 was price
cutting . . . The legislative intervention was grounded en-
tirely upon the public interest and the Legislature may
properly have believed that in undertaking to exercise con-
trol over the milk industry it ought empower its administra-
tive agent not only to fix, if necessary, minimum prices fair
to the industry but also, if necessary, maximum prices fair
to the consuming public.58
The broad legal standards of cost of production, rate of return
and fair price to consumers are only partial aspects of milk control
legislation. As in establishing a fair return in other regulated in-
dustries, the economic problems and conflicting economic interests
compete within the legal statutory framework.
54 332 Pa. 15, 30, 1 A.2d 775, 783 (1938).
55 Business and Economic Conditions, First National City Bank of New York, 1958.
56 National Dairy Products Corp. reported sales of $1,605,725,000 for 1959 and an Increase in
net earnings for the eighth consecutive year. Pittsburgh Post Gazette, March 22, 1960.
57 Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251 (1936); Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Te
Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936) (Differential allowed only to existing dealers).
58 Abbotts Dairies, Inc., v. Armstrong, 14 N.J. 319, 102 A.2d 372, 375 (1954).




In the quarter of a century since the inception of milk control,
there have been three distinctly different periods of economic con-
ditions and marketing problems. During the thirties, the prime
objective was to alleviate the depression and to raise milk prices
from depression levels. Shortages and nationwide price controls
dominated the milk marketing scene during World War II. The
postwar period has been identified by rising commodity prices,
the growth of interstate milksheds, the expansion of nationwide
dairy corporations and the continuing problem of a milk surplus.
The preamble of the Louisiana Orderly Marketing Law of 1958
illustrates this change in emphasis:
Whereas it is the intent of the legislature to prevent
the economic destruction of many dairy farmers, dairy
plants, ice cream dealers and resale merchants as a result
of discriminatory trade practices by certain business organ-
izations financially strong enough to sell below their own
costs for an extended period of time which presents a situa-
tion detrimental to the health, welfare and economy of the
people of this state . . . 9
While the Louisiana act provides for the control of farm prices
when requested by at least fifty percent of the producers in a given
market, the bulk of the statute regulates the resale practices of
discount rebates, advertising costs, free storage and refrigeration
equipment supplied to retailers and other similar trade practices.
Highly competitive practices6" in the wholesale and retail aspects
of milk distribution have forced other state commissions to regulate
such competition along with price controls. New York State has
attempted to control competition by limiting the number of dealer
licenses in areas where it is shown "that the issuance of a license
will lead to destructive competition in a market adequately served,"
or where the issuance of the license "is not in the public interest."6 1
In Shearer's Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court stated:
* * *Although governmental price fixing and its con-
comitants may run counter to the philosophy of free enter-
prise, it has been firmly established in relation to milk for
over a quarter of a century; that milk control is founded
upon price control; and that to maintain an established
price, it is necessary to prevent the seller from giving to the
purchaser any thing of value related to the sale, which is
in addition to the product and service for which the price
was established. (Emphasis added.)62
As federal marketing orders under the agricultural adjustment
acts are limited to minimum producer prices, trade practices be-
tween processor and retailer are regulated primarily at the state
level.
59 La. Code Ann., rif. 40 1 940.1, (Supp. 1959). This statute was upheld in Schwegmann Bros. v.
McCrory, 237 La. 768, 112 So. 2d 606 (1959). See also Cal. Agri. Code f 43 60 (6).
60 In one area of Pennsylvania advertising costs for nineteen dealers according to the dealers
own exhibit totaled $1,388,274.00. Dealers Exhibit 2, Milk Control Commission Hearings February
10, 1960, Pittsburgh, Pa.
61 New York Consol. Laws, art. 21, 258 (c) (1954). See also Grimstead v. Carey, 150 N.Y.2d 657
(1956); Friendship Dairies v. DuMond, 131 N.Y.S. 2d 51 (1954).
62 191 Pa. Super. 574, 576, 159 A.2d 268, 269-70 (1960). See also Milk Maid Dairy Products, Inc.
v. Milk Control Comm'n, 190 Pa. Supe', 410, 154 A.2d 274 (1959).
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From the standpoint of the producer, there is the traditional
agricultural problem of maintaining a balance between supply and
demand. Despite improved methods of breeding to equalize the
flow of milk, spring overproduction continues to be a factor in
decreasing the producer's return. Many states like Pennsylvania
have attempted to discourage seasonal flooding of the market by
a decrease in prices for these months. However, an attempt by the
New Jersey milk director to impose a production-controlling "norm
and excess" plan upon producers and dealers under the guise of
price control was held by the New Jersey Supreme Court to be
beyond his statutory power.
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Even more threatening to the dairy farmer are the changing
habits of milk consumption. While total consumption of milk has
increased, the sales of cream and premium fluid milk with a high
butterfat content have declined.6 4 The July report of the United
States Department of Agriculture shows a spring-time increase of
eight percent over 1959 in the sale of skim milk. The increased
sales of fortified skim and new low fat products can reduce pro-
ducer "blend" prices based on butterfat content. Furthermore,
many states have adulterated-milk statutes which specifically de-
fine the butterfat content of fluid milk and prohibit the sale of
such low fat products.65 The paradoxical questibn of when milk
is "milk" may have to be pesolved by either state legislative bodies
or the courts through the interpretation of adulterated-milk statutes.
The United States Department of Agriculture reports that
during the period 1956-1959, the traditional pattern of milk distribu-
tion has shifted from the quart to multiple-quart containers, and
from home delivery to retail sales outlets, with resulting price
differentials. In Safeway Stores v. Milk Comm'n, Justice Spratley
attempted to distinguish between a "legal" and an "illegal" price
differential as follows:
The words "grade, quantity, or class" ..... permit clas-
sification of milk according to "grade, quantity or class."
They do not permit classification according to the method
of distribution; i.e., whether by home-delivery or store-
delivery. The quality of the milk of a particular grade
or class is not affected merely by reason of the method of
delivery, the character of its container, or the quantity in-
volved.
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A discount based on quantity is not a price differential
based on grade such as is prohibited. The price is the same
for the same grade in any quantity involved. A differential
.measured by quantity results in no discrimination between
distributors or between consumers. It applies to all alike,
and allows an economic saving both to seller and pur-
chaser.6
However, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in American Can
Co. v. Milk Control Bd stated that minimum prices should take into
63 Appeals of Port Murray Dairy Co., 6 N.J. Super 285, 71 A.2d 208 (1950).
64Smith and Hermann, Changing Patterns in Fluid Milk Distribution, U.S.D.A., p. 1. (Aug. 1956).
65 The Act of June 8, 1911, P.L. 712, as amended, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 31 1 521 (1958), provides
that it is unlawful to sell milk "which contains less than three and one quarter (31/4) per centum
of butter fat" except that "... not more than one half (1/2) of one (1) per centum of butter fat
may be sold, if sold as skimmed milk".
66 197 Va. 69, 87 S.E.2d 769, 773 (1955).
67 Id. at 774.
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account not only the kind or quality of the product sold, "but the
entire service rendered by the seller in making the sale, so that a
higher minimum price can be fixed for milk that is delivered at the
residence of the buyer."' 8 (emphasis added). While there has been
no litigation on this question, price differentials between home and
store purchases exist in Pennsylvania and many other states.
Quantity discounts for purchases of two or more quarts have
been upheld in Montana subject to the price standard based on
producer prices of Montana's statute 9 and such discounts are in-
cluded within the California statute itself.
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A California court found that a price differential based upon
glass versus paper containers violated the state milk-control law of
that state.7'1 A recent California decision, however, held that the
packaging costs of the cheapest carton could not be used to deter-
mine minimum prices, but that the commission would have to
consider packaging costs of representative distributors.7 2 A recent
New Jersey case upheld the legality of the gallon jug as a container
for milk distribution.7 3 Recent hearings before the Pennsylvania
Milk Control Commission in the Philadelphia area have revolved
around the validity of a price differential based on this method of
distribution.
Classification of milk by butterfat content has been the usual
practice under most state control laws.74 However, attempts to
establish separate prices for milk from Guernsey cows as opposed
to other types of milk have been held to be unreasonable.75 Orig-
inally, milk containing Vitamin A was classified by dealers as a
premium product. While this is still true in many states, the in-
finitesimal cost of these additives, considerably less than a half cent
per quart, has raised questions on the validity of such differentials.7 6
The city attorneys of Pittsburgh and Philadelphia have repeatedly
raised this question in hearings before the Pennsylvania Milk Com-
mission. Recently the Director of the New Jersey Office of Milk
Industry eliminated this practice in the state.
77
Where a specific exemption does not exist, any governmental
institution, including federal agencies, 78 are subject to the state
minimum-price orders. Some price control statutes, however, spe-
cifically exempt certain governmental corporations and charitable
institutions.79 In other states, the commission or administrator may
establish a separate classification and price differential.80 As milk
is required under the federal school lunch program, the cost of this
product may often determine the scope and quantity of other food
68 316 Mass. 337, 55 N.E.2d 453, 454 (1944).
69 Heimbichner v. Montana Milk Control Board, 134 Mt. 366, 332 P.2d 922 (1958).
70 Col. Agri. Code § 4357.
71 Challenge Cream & Butter Ass'n. v. Parker, 23 Col. 2d 137, 142 P.2d 737, (1943); Amer. Can
Co. v. Milk Control Board, 316 Mass. 337, 55 N.E.2d 453 (1944).
72 Sentell v. Jacobsen, 163 Col. 2d 748, 329 P.2d 932 (1958).
73 Pied Piper Super Market v. Hoffman, 160 A.2d 135 (N.J. 1960).
74 State v. Farmers Union Co-op., 160 Ore. 205, 84 P.2d 471 (1938).
75 New York State Guernsey Breeders Co-op. v. Wickard, 141 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1944); Weiss v.
Milk Control Comm'n 71 Douph. 33 (Dauphin Co. C. P. Ct. 1957).
76 New Jersey Office of Milk Industry Order No. 60-1: . For a period of years this office has
authorized a differential of one cent per quart over regular milk prices to be charged for milk
containing Vitamin D. The testimony . . . indicates that the costs of the additive are olmost negli-
gible. I, therefore, find that the Vitamin D differential is not justified".
77 Ibid.
78 Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm'n 318 U.S. 261 (1943). Cf. Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v.
Dept. of Agriculture of Cal. 318 U.S. 285 11943).
79 See State v. Auclair, 110 Vt. 147, 4 A.2d 107 (1939).
80 New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
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items. For this reason the City Solicitor of Philadelphia, in a milk-
price hearing in June, 1960,81 specifically requested that school milk
be specially classified as a decontrolled item under the Pennsylvania
law. In a recent California case, 2 the court found that a reduction
in price to schools of noncontrolled dairy products, by a dealer
selling school milk, was not a violation of price control as "such
sales were severable," even though the total transaction actually
represented a reduction in price.
V. CONCLUSION
There are many who advocate elimination of state milk pricing
agencies and the return to free competitive markets. Conversely,
there are advocates of state control laws in free market states. The
milk industry is unique in that it includes big and little business,
farmer and processor, economic giants and dwarfs, all involved in
a product subject to health hazards and vital to the urban con-
sumer. Perhaps such a maelstrom of conflicting interests requires
a referee in the form of a state commission or administrator to
arbitrate the demands of each group.
In states where retail milk prices are regulated, urban con-
sumers are interested parties. The municipal solicitor, with his
growing experience before other regulatory agencies, appears to
have a logical role in milk price proceedings. Traditional municipal
regulation of the sanitary aspect of the production and distribution
of milk sets a precedent for municipal interest in this field. As deal-
ers and producers organize into trade lobbies and associations with
full time, able counsel, it is only equitable that the urban resident
also have adequate legal representation.
Appendix A
Alabama Code Ann., Tit. 22, Sec. 205 (1941 Supp. 1955).
California Ag. Code Ann., C. 17, Sec. 4200 (1954 Supp. 1959).
Florida Stat. Ann., Tit. 31, Sec. 501.01 (1943 Supp. 1959).
Georgia Code Ann., C. 42, Sec. 523 (1957).
Louisiana Code Ann., Tit. 40, Sec. 940.1 (1951 Supp. 1959).
Maine, C. 33, Sec. 1 (1954).
Massachusetts Gen. Laws Ann., C. 94A, Sec. 21 (1954).
Montana Rev. Code Ann., Sec. 27-401 (1947).
Nevada Rev. Stat., Tit. 51, Sec. 584-315 (1959).
New Hampshire Rev. Stat., Tit. XIV, Sec. 183 (1955).
New Jersey Stat. Ann., Tit. 4, Sec. 12-A (1959).
New York Consol. Laws, Art. 21, Sec. 252 (1954).
North Carolina Gen. Stat. Ann., Sec. 106-260 (1952 Supp. 1959).
Pennsylvania Stat. Ann., Tit. 31, Sec. 700-j-101 et seq (1958).
Rhode Island Gen. Laws, Sec. 21-4-1 (1956).
South Carolina Code Ann., Tit. 32, Sec. 1610 (1952 Supp. 1959).
Virginia Code Ann., C. 17, Sec. 3-346 (1950).
Vermont Stat. Ann., Tit. 6, C. 147, Sec. 2501 (1958).
81 Milk Commission Hearings, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, June 6 et seq 1960.
82 Jacobsen v. Dairy Mart Farms, Inc., 154 Cal. 2d 287, 315 P.2d 932 (1957).
SRRS-AERLOR- CORPORATION SERLS- RLPIE 5-3422
DICTA
